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DEFAMATION ACTION FOR OPINION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECT OF MLKOVICH V. LORAIN JOURNAL CO.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co.,2 commentators declared that the broad First
Amendment protection that had been afforded in defamation cases to
anything that could be labeled "opinion" was dead.' Although this
protection had existed for only sixteen years,' it figured prominently in

many decisions. 5 Milkovich would, therefore, seem to expose defamation
defendants to a high degree of liability. 6

This note demonstrates, however, that predictions about greater
liability in defamation actions arising from the Milkovich decision were

exaggerated. First, this note examines the opinion defense and the
constitutional protection for opinions that the Court struck down in

Milkovich. The opinion defense was not a single doctrine; rather, it was
a series of attempts by courts to answer a central question: What is a fact

and what is an opinion? This note considers whether those cases should
1. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (dictum).
2. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Court Deals Blow to Patronage, Libel Privilege, NAT'L
L.J., July 2, 1990, at 5 (concluding that Milkovich would put an end to expansive First
Amendment protections previously enjoyed in the libel law area); Cary Payton Rich,
Supreme Court M~xes Opinion Protection, FOLIO, Aug. 1, 1990, at 18 (explaining that by
removing the protection formerly afforded to "opinion," the Milkovich decision would
probably increase the number of libel suits).
4. The Supreme Court first extended First Amendment protection to opinion in Gertz,
418 U.S. at 323. See infra notes 28-58 and accompanying text.
5. While it is difficult, if not impossible, to say exactly how many cases have
examined the issue of constitutional protection for opinion in defamation cases, the number
appears to exceed 500.
The opinion defense has been asserted in a very wide range of factual situations.
Compare Mr. Chow of N.Y. v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding
that a negative restaurant review is a constitutionally protected opinion) with Street v. NBC,
645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that an allegedly inaccurate historical television
drama about the plaintiff is not a constitutionally protected opinion).
6. See, e.g., Is It Opinion or Is It Fact?: Libel Ruling a Huge Setback for Speech,
L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1990, at B6.
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now be treated as overruled, or whether some of these cases suggest
approaches to the issue of action for defamation by opinion that would be
useful even after Milkovich. Second, this note examines the extent to
which an opinion is now actionable in a suit for defamation. It explores
the common-law antecedents of the opinion defense and considers whether
they should be revived in the aftermath of Milkovich. Third, this note
measures the extent to which state courts, through their constitutions, may
be willing to keep the opinion defense alive, and examines cases that have
established other defenses. Finally, this note concludes that the opinion
defense is still alive, but the central questions have shifted slightly.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE FOR
OPINION IN DEFAMATION CASES

A. Defamation at Common Law
Defamation is a broad term encompassing the two separate commonlaw torts of libel and slander. 7 Both torts require that the defendant has
communicated information to a third party or parties and that the
information has had the effect, or the potential effect, of damaging the
plaintiff's reputation. 8 The policy consideration behind defamation is to
provide security that a person's reputation will not be maligned. 9
Slander is spoken defamation." It generally requires the plaintiff to
show some type of economic harm caused by the defendant's defamation
for the plaintiff to recover damages." Libel is "defamation expressed by
print, writing, pictures or signs," 12 although spoken words in a broadcast
can also be a basis for libel. 3 The most obvious form of libel occurs
when defamation appears in a newspaper, book, magazine, radio or
television broadcast. But libel has also been found in such diverse media
as a hanging in effigy14 and dictation to a stenographer.15 The measure
of damages for libel is usually the extent to which the plaintiff's reputation
7. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
at 771 (5th ed. 1984).
8. Id.at 773.
9. Id.at 771.
10. Id.§ 112, at 785.
11. Id.at 788-95.
12. BLACK's LAw DICTiONARY 915 (6th ed. 1990).
13. See Dibble v. WROC TV Channel 8, 530 N.Y.S.2d 388 (App. Div. 1988).
14. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 112, at 786.
15. Id.

111,
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is harmed by the defamation, but punitive damages are also awarded in
certain situations. "6
At common law, the plaintiff was merely required to show that he or
she was defamed by the defendant and that the defamation damaged the
plaintiff's reputation.'" In a civil action, the defendant was offered the
chance to justify the defamation by proving that the defamatory words
were true.' If the defamatory words were true, the defendant would not
be held liable for the defamation. 9 In a criminal proceeding for

defamation, however, truth was not a defense.'
B. The Constitutional Underpinnings
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,"' added a new constitutional dimension to defamation cases.
The Court recognized that, in protecting the reputation of individuals,
states were restricting freedom of speech and freedom of the press.'
This was held to be a violation of the First Amendment.'
Sullivan created two significant safeguards for defendants in

defamation actions brought by public officials complaining of defamation
relating to official action.' First, it shifted the burden of proving the
falsity of the defamatory statements from the defendant to the plaintiff. 5
Second, it required the plaintiff to prove that the defamatory falsehood
16. Id. § 116A, at 845.
17. Id. § 115, at 804.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 116, at 839.
20. Id. at 840. The policy consideration supporting criminal libel laws was to preserve
the peace, not to protect the reputation of the defamation victim. Therefore, paradoxically,
in a criminal libel case, the greater the truth of the defamation, the greater the enormity of
the crime. Id.
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. See id. at 265.
23. See id. The First Amendment's Freedom of Speech Clause is applicable to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
24. The plaintiff in Sullivan was the Commissioner of the Montgomery, Alabama,
Police Department.- Id. at 258. The alleged defamation was in an advertisement published
in the New York 7lmes to raise money for Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s legal defense fund.
Id. at 257-58. The advertisement alleged various excesses of the Montgomery Police
Department and certain unnamed officials. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the average reader
would know that he was one of the unnamed officials and that he was, therefore, defamed.
Id. at258.
25. See id. at 283-84.
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was made with "actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' These
principles were later extended to cases involving "public figures. "2
In 1974, the Supreme Court established the constitutional protections
applicable to private plaintiffs in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. In Gertz,
the Court held that while the protections outlined in Sullivan were not
appropriate for cases involving private parties,' certain significant
protections were warranted in adjudicatory private-party claims. First,
states could not impose liability without some showing of fault.'
Moreover, states could not permit recovery of presumed or punitive
damages without -a showing of Sullivan malice. 3
The constitutional privilege for opinion was based on dicta in Gertz:
"Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction

not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other
ideas." 32 This wording has been quoted so extensively and is reproduced
inso many of the cases discussed in this note that it is referred to as the

"Gertz dicta." The Gertz dicta generally has been cited to illustrate that

the First Amendment provides a constitutional privilege for opinion,33

even though that issue was not actually raised in Gertz. 4

26. Id. at 279-80.
27. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Public figures are people
who have voluntarily placed themselves in the public spotlight. Id. at 154-55.
28. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
29. See id. at 343.
30. Id. at 347. "Fault" in this context was not defined. As discussed below, there is
room for debate as to exactly what "fault" must mean with regard to the defendant in a
case brought by a private plaintiff. See infra notes 217-27 and accompanying text.
31. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
32. Id. at 339-40 (dicta).
33. See, e.g., Pricev. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1431-32 (8th Cir. 1989);
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1983); Bose Corp. of United
States, Inc., v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 193 (1st Cir.
1982); Chureh of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1286 (5th Cir. 1981); Avins v.
White, 627 F.2d 637, 642 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Orr v.
Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979);
Bucldey v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
34. Elmer Gertz, the plaintiff, was a lawyer in a civil case representing the family of
a youth shot by a Chicago policeman. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325. After a John Birch Society
publication accused him of being a communist and of having helped frame the policeman,
Gertz sued for libel. See id. at 326-27. The issue was whether his representation of the
family in a highly visible trial made him a public figure. See id. at 330. Upon finding that
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The question that arises, therefore, is how the Gertz dicta erroneously
came to be accepted as creating a constitutional protection for opinion.

One contributing factor may have been that the Supreme Court decided
Gertz and Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austhe on the same day.

Austin involved a libel action brought by postal employees claiming that
they had been defamed in a union publication distributed to their fellow

employees.37 The publication contained a list of names, identified as the
"List of Scabs." 3" In addition, the publication printed an extremely
derogatory definition of the word "scab. "
The Austin Court held that the words complained of were not

actionable because they were mere hyperbole or invective, uttered in the
heat of a union-organizing campaign, and were not meant to be taken as
literally true.' The Court based this part of its decision on prior cases 4
and on the Gertz dicta. 42 The Court quoted the Gertz dicta and held that
"[b]efore the test of reckless or knowing falsity can be met, there must be
a false statement of fact."4 By using the Gertz dicta, the Austin Court

implied that Gertz stood for the principle that a constitutional basis exists
for shielding opinions from defamation actions. 1

Gertz was not a public figure, the Court had to decide what the appropriate standard of
malice for a private plaintiff should be. See id. at 332.
35. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705 (1990).
36. 418 U.S. 264 (1974). Both Austin and Gertz were decided on June 25, 1974. See
id.; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
37. Austin, 418 U.S. at 267-69.
38. Id. at 267.
39. Id. at 268.
"After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had some
awful substance left with which He made a scab.
A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a
combination backbone of jelly and glue. Where others have hearts, he carries a
tumor of rotten principles."
Id. (quoting The Scab, CARRIER'S CORNER, June, 1970). The Court indicated that this
quote is generally attributed to author Jack London. Id.
40. See id. at 286. The Court also found that the words were not actionable under
federal labor law and a prior case, Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), but
that these were alternate grounds. The Court reached the same result independently on each
basis. See Austin, 418 U.S. at 284.
41. The Court based its decision on Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398
U.S. 6, 14 (1970); Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943).
42. See Austin, 418 U.S. at 284.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a
newspaper columnist's defamatory statements about a college professor are constitutionally
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Although an association was thus formed between Austin and Gertz,
Austin followed the precedent of Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v.
Bresler.Y In Bresler, a group of officials negotiating with a developer
characterized the developer's bargaining position as "blackmail."' The
Court determined that the average reader would not take the term
"blackmail" to mean that the developer actually was engaging in criminal
conduct. 7 In both Bresler and Austin, the Supreme Court held that words
must be examined in context to determine if they are defamatory."
According to the Milkovich Court, this reasoning created an inadvertent
implication that an absolute constitutional privilege existed for opinion in
defamation actions.49 But in view of later Courts' wide acceptance of the
principle discussed below, it can be said that the inference was reasonable.
The earliest case involving the opinion defense ' to reach the federal
appellate level was Buckley v. Littell.51 In Buckley, the court noted the
line of cases leading from Sullivan to Gertz and concluded that Gertz
"made the distinction-crucial to the issue-between 'false statements of
fact' which receive no constitutional protection, and 'ideas' and 'opinions'
which by definition can never be 'false' so as to constitute false statements
which are unprotected when made with actual malice." 52 The court then
used the opinion defense to dismiss two of the three libel claims raised in
the complaint.5' The trial court's finding of liability on the third count,
however, was sustained because the words complained of were false
statements of fact.' Once again, the court quoted Gertz: "Even while
Gertz... in effect states that an expression of 'pure opinion' may not be
protected expressions of opinion), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
45. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
46. Id. at 7.
47. See id. at 14. Imputation of criminal conduct is libelous per so. See id. at 19
(White, J., concurring) (citing a jury instruction placing the burden on the plaintiff to show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the publication imputed a crime to the plaintiff).
48. See id. at 15; Austin, 418 U.S. at 296-97.
49. See Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. at 2705 (discussing the source of the opinion defense
and finding that these cases did not establish a constitutional privilege for opinion).
50. Although action of defamation is a state cause of action, the opinion defense was
based on the United States Constitution. Therefore, this note mostly examines cases that
reached the federal appellate level.
51. 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
52. Id. at 893 (citation omitted).
53. See id.at 894.
54. See id.
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the basis of an action for defamation, it also said.

that 'there is no

constitutional value in false statements of fact.'"55

Although the court in Buckley recognized a constitutional opinion
defense in determining liability, it is important to note that the court

determined whether the defamation complained of was fact or opinion

without remanding the case to the trial court. 56 Thus, without explicitly
saying so, the court turned this determination into a question of law

instead of a question of fact. Courts in later cases have followed this
practice, holding that whether a given statement is fact or opinion is
always a question of law.58
C. The Restatement Approach
Assuming that a constitutional protection for opinion existed, the next
question was how to distinguish a fact from an opinion. During the sixteen
years between Gert"

and Milkovich,w° courts and commentators

struggled to develop a bright-line test or at the least an objective method
that would make this task easier. At first, the most common method was

to examine whether the statement was truly a subjective opinion,
expressing the speaker's feelings, or whether it was actually a disguised

assertion, such as an opinion that implied the existence of undisclosed
facts. 61

55. Id. at 896 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 401).
56. See id. at 893-94.
57. This note refers to a question of fact to be determined by the fact finder as a "jury
question." This terminology is necessary to avoid confusion between use of the word "fact"
in the context of fact versus opinion and in the context of what is a question of law or what
is a question to be determined by the fact finder.
58. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1127 (1985).
59. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
60. Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. at 2695.
61. See, e.g., Orrv. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT], which states
that an opinion is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts
as the basis for the opinion), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Hotehner v. CastilloPuche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.) (finding that libel may occur when an author combines
a negative depiction of a person with a "false implication that the author is privy to facts
about the person that are unknown to the general reader"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834
(1977).
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The process began with the Restatement (Second) of Torts,62 which
was released after Gertz was decided. The Restatement took the position

that a "pure" opinion was not actionable but an opinion that implied the
existence of undisclosed facts was actionable if those facts were proven to
be false.6s The comments in the appendix to the Restatement contained
various hypothetical cases, including illustrations based on Bresler" and
Austin.0
The Second Circuit applied the Restatement approach in Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche.66 The Third Circuit also adopted this view in Avins v.

White,67 as did the Sixth Circuit in Orr v. Argus-Press Co." In Orr,
however, the difficulty of this approach became apparent. The plaintiff in

Orr was arrested for securities-law violations in connection with a
shopping mall he had tried to develop.'

The defendant's newspaper

reported that Orr was charged with "fraud" in connection with a "phony
shopping mall scheme," which sought to "take $250,000 from local

investors."'

The plaintiff claimed that this was a distortion of what

actually had happened. He sought to show, in his defamation action, that

the shopping mall was a legitimate plan that merely failed to attract
62. RESTATEMENT, supra note 61, § 566. "Mhe statement in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. [the Gertz dicta] quoted in Comment c, plus the holdings in [Austin] and [Bresler] are
regarded as having the effect of a holding that the Constitution does not permit recovery
in defamation for publication of a 'pure opinion.'" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app.
§ 566 reporter's note (1981) (citations omitted) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT APPENDIX]. For
a spirited criticism of the Restatement's approach, see Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J.
Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 825, 880-87 (1984).
63. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 61, § 566 cmt. b.
64. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); see also supra
notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
65. Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); see RESTATEMENT
APPENDIX, supra note 62, § 566 cmt. c; see also supra notes 36-44.
66. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977). Novelist A.E.
Hotchner brought suit against Spanish writer Jose Luis Castillo-Puche and against CastilloPuche's publisher, Doubleday, based on statements made by Castillo-Puche in a book he
wrote about his experiences with Ernest Hemingway. Id. at 912. The statements described
Hotchner as a "toady" and a "hypocrite," who used his friendship with Hemingway for
personal advantage. Id. The court noted that "[ilf an author represents that he has private,
first-hand knowledge, which substantiates the opinions he expresses, the expression of
opinion becomes as damaging as an assertion of fact." Id. at 913.
67. 627 F.2d 637 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980).
68. 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979).
69. Id. at 1110.
70. Id.
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adequate investment.7 He further sought to show that .while the
indictment might be read to imply some fraud-like malfeasance, there was
no actual charge of fraud, nor was the shopping mall plan "phony."'
The court, relying heavily on the analysis of the opinion defense in the
Restatement, held that, as a matter of law, the language in the article was
a statement of opinion. 3 In particular, the court relied on the
hypothetical example taken from Bresler, equating the "blackmail" epithet
in Bresler with the "fraud" label in the present case.74 In doing so,
however, the court acted very mechanically. It ignored the reasoning
behind the Supreme Court's finding that "blackmail" was not actionable
in Bresler-thatthe ordinary reader would realize that the plaintiff was not
being accused of a crime and that the words were merely hyperbole. 75
In Orr, the ordinary reader would reasonably presume that the plaintiff
actually had been accused of fraud. The court's application of Bresler,
therefore, seems inappropriate.
A similar problem arose in the Eighth Circuit in Lauderback v.
American Broadcasting Co. 76 As in Orr, the .court did not discuss the
root of the Bresler and Austin decisions-that the words complained of
were mere invective, not meant to denote actual criminal activity,' and
that Bresler7 and Austin require a court to look to the context of the
defamation.

1

The Fifth Circuit looked at the context of the defamation in Church
of Scientology v. Cazaresi with a somewhat different approach. The
court recognized a specific constitutional protection for opinions and used
the context of the speaker's community to determine whether the statement
was an opinion.' For example, one statement made by the defendant was
that the plaintiff organization was not in actuality a religious organization,
71. See id.
72. See id.

73. See id.at 1115.
74. See id.
75. See Bresler, 398 U.S. at 14.
76. 741 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985). A television
news program created the strong impression that the plaintiff had been swindling elderly
people while selling them Medicare-supplement insurance policies. See id. at 195. The
court equated the "traitor" epithet in Austin with the swindler implication in the television
program and found that the implication was not actionable. See id. at 197.
77. See Austin, 418 U.S. at 285-86; Bresler, 398 U.S. at 14.
78. See Austin, 418 U.S. at 283-86; Bresler, 398 U.S. at 14.
79. 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981).
80. See id. at 1288.
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but rather a "rip-off, money motivated operation." 8 ' The court
considered the meaning of the word "religion" in the defendant's
community-Clearwater, Florida-and concluded that the Church of
Scientology was not a religion within that meaning.' This analysis seems
valid but incomplete because it does not consider the Restatement approach
of whether the "opinion" implied the existence of undisclosed facts, much
less whether those facts were false.
The Tenth Circuit applied a more appropriate context analysis in Pring
v. Penthouse International, Ltd.' The Pring plaintiff had been Miss
Wyoming in the Miss America Pageant." The defendant published an
account of the pageant in which Miss Wyoming was described as having
performed various sex acts on stage.' The court in Pring stressed the
context of the story:'
The test is not whether the story is or is not characterized as
"fiction," "humor," or anything else in the publication, but
whether the charged portions in context could be reasonably
understood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff or actual
events in which she participated. If it could not be so understood,
the charged portions could not be taken literally.8 7
In a more recent but strikingly similar case, Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell,8 the Supreme Court followd a similar line of reasoning,
which indicates that Pringis still good law. In Falwell, a nationally known
minister sued a publication that depicted him in a parodist advertisement
as losing his virginity to his mother during a drunken rendezvous in the
fhmily outhouse." Although the advertisement contained a disclaimer
stating that it was fiction, Falwell sued for libel and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.' The Supreme Court held that, because the lower
court found that this ad could not reasonably be believed and that the
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1284 n.10.
See id. at 1289.
695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
Id. at439.
Id. at 440-41.
See id. at 442-43.
Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
485 U.S. 46 (1988); see also infra note 230.
Id. at 48.
Id.
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respondent was a "public figure" for First Amendment purposes, the
respondent could collect neither compensatory nor punitive damages."'
D. The Early Balancing Tests
In 1980, in Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co.,' the Second
Circuit had an opportunity to reconsider its line of reasoning set forth in
Buckley v. Littell and Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche.' In Cianci, the
defendant newspaper published an article detailing the account of a rape
that the plaintiff, the Mayor of Providence, Rhode Island, had been
accused of committing when he was a law student in Wisconsin.9'
Plaintiff sued and claimed that the article was defamatory because he had
never been charged or indicted for rape.' In its ruling, the court did not
overrule any of its earlier precedent but instead began to redefine its
earlier reasoning.
The Cianci court specifically rejected the contention that Gertz
required a broad constitutional protection for all opinions.' The court
stated that the Gertz dicta had become "the opening salvo in all arguments
for protection from defamation actions on the ground of opinion, even
though the case did not remotely concern the question." 98 The Cianci
court instead chose to rely on whether the statements were true. 99
Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Herbert v. Lando,' the
Cianci court recognized that "a plaintiff within the ambit of Sullivan has,
at least as a practical matter, the burden of proving falsity, since he must
91. See id. at 57.
92. 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
93. 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); see also supra
notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
94. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); see also supra note

66.
95. See Cianci, 639 F.2d at 56.
96. See id. at 54.
97. See id. at 64.
98. Id. at 61. This passage was quoted approvingly in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705 (1990).
99. See Cianci, 639 F.2d at 61.
100. 441 U.S. at 153 (holding that in a libel suit, neither the First Amendment's
guarantee of free press or free speech prevents a plaintiff from inquiring into the "editorial
processes of those responsible for the publication when the inquiry will produce evidence
material to the proof of a critical element" of its case).'
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in any event establish that the defendant published with knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. "101

Based on Lando, Austin, and Bresler, the Cianci court developed a
three-part standard for use in defamation actions:

(1) .. .a pejorative statement of opinion concerning a public
figure generally is constitutionally protected, quite apart from
Sullivan, no matter how vigorously expressed; (2) . . . this

principle applies even when the statement includes a term which
could refer to criminal conduct if the term could not reasonably
be so understood in context; but (3)... the principle does not
cover a charge which could reasonably be understood as imputing
specific criminal or other wrongful acts. 1"

By "opinion" in (1) above, the court should be understood as referring to
"pure opinion," and not an opinion "laden with facts. " " This is very
similar to the approach taken in the Restatement," which Orr applied

mechanically." °s Although Orr and Cianci had slightly similar fact

patterns," °6 the reasoning developed in the two cases led to very

different results."°
In Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp.,'"
the Ninth Circuit developed a three-part test to determine whether a

statement was fact or opinion. The court considered (1) "the facts
surrounding the publication";

(2) the context of the statement;

101. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 59.
102. Id. at 64.
103. Id. at 63. In discussing Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), the
Ciand court recognized the Buckley court's holding that the term "fascist" is so ambiguous
that it is not really verifiable and is thus pure opinion, which does not imply any unrevealed
facts. Id. at 62-63.
104. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 61, § 566.
105. See Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 960 (1979); see also supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
106. Both Cianci and Orr were brought by plaintiffs claiming that they had been
falsely accused of crimes in the defendants' publications. See supra notes 69-72, 95-96 and
accompanying text.
107. See Cianci, 639 F.2d at 64. The court in Canci distinguished Orr on the basis
that an indictment had been handed down against the plaintiff in Orr, thus making the
verifiability issue a question of what "fraud" meant. See id. at 59 n.8. This, however, was
not the actual line of reasoning in Orr, which relied on Bresler, a case rejected by Ciand
as not applicable on the facts. See id.
108. 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980).
109. Id. at 784.
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and (3) the language used to express the opinion-statement, taking into
consideration both the way it is phrased and its intended audience.110
Although this test is based on a context analysis, the court, as in Church

of Scientology v.

Cazares,"' did not discuss the question of

implication-whether the statement was implying the existence of facts that

were not being stated directly.
The defamation action in Information Control Corp. arose out of a suit
and a countersuit that previously had been filed by the parties after a
commercial deal collapsed. The defamation was a public statement by one
party's general counsel that the other party's breach-of-contract suit was
a mere subterfuge to avoid paying commissions.1 12 The court reasoned
that "[b]usiness litigants frequently disparage an opponent's suit as a
meritless tactical device. Such charges may not be commendable, but they
are highly unlikely to be understood by their audience as statements of fact
rather than the predictable opinion of management for one side about the
other's motives."" 3
E. The Ollman Test
The effort to find some method of determining what was fact and what
was opinion reached its climax in 1984, in Ollman v. Evans.14 The
Olman court noted the problems that other circuits had encountered and
recognized that most courts had considered only limited facets of the
fact-opinion dichotomy. 1 5 In response, the District of Columbia Circuit
developed a surprisingly simple four-part test, according to which the
court must examine (1) the common meaning and usage of the words
complained of; (2) the degree to which the statement is verifiable; (3) the
immediate context in which the statement was made (the actual wording
and (4) the broader context in which the
surrounding the statement);
11 6
statement was made.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id. at 783-84.
638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981).
Infonnation Control Corp., 611 F.2d at 783.
Id. at 784.
750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
See id. at 977.
See id. at 979-84.
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The first two prongs of the Oilman test drew heavily on the Second
Circuit's line of cases: Buckley v. Littell,'1 Hotchner v. CastilloPuche, and Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co." 9 The second two
prongs, however, brought in the Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v.
Austin," Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 1 and
Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd. " line of cases, with an added
consideration of the "implied facts" of the Restatement approach.1 23 The
test thus considered factors of the context, the verifiability, and the plain
import of the words, including their implications. If there had been an
absolute constitutional privilege for opinion, this test would have been the
best method developed to find the distinction between fact and opinion.
The Oilman test was adopted quickly by several other circuits."
The Second Circuit, which had derided Gertz's broad opinion defense in
Cianci,12 5 adopted the Olman test in 1985.126

F. The Supreme Court Steps In
As early as 1982, the Supreme Court indicated that it had never
intended to extend First Amendment protection to opinions in defamation
actions. In a memorandum opinion that year, the Court denied certiorari
in the case of Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co."

Justice

Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, dissented arguing that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court had indicated that it was bound by Gertz independently to
117. 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); see also supra
notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
118. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); see also supra note
66 and accompanying text.
119. 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980); see also supra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
120. 418 U.S. 264 (1974); see also supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
121. 398 U.S. 6 (1970); see also supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
122. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); see also
supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
123. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 61, § 566. The context was to be examined to see
if it implied any facts. See Oilman, 750 F.2d at 982.
124. See, e.g., Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280
(4th Cir. 1987); Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th
CBS v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 485 U.S.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub noma.
993 (1988); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
883 (1986); Mr. Chow of N.Y. v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1985).
125. See Cianci, 639 F.2d at 61.
126. See Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 221.
127. 459 U.S. 923 (1982).

1991]

NOTE

review the lower court's finding and to determine if the defamation was
a statement of fact or opinion.'28 Rehnquist stated that "it seems
probable to me that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in discussing the
subject was relying on the [Gertz dicta].... I am confident this Court did
not intend to wipe out this 'rich and complex history' with the two
sentences of dicta in Gertz ......
Although this dissent was noted by
commentators, 1" it failed to correct courts' assumptions that Gertz
requires First Amendment protection for opinions in defamation actions.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.' 3 was an appropriate case for the
Court to use in striking down the opinion defense because the defamatory
statement complained of was difficult to classify as either fact or opinion.
The plaintiff in Milkovich was a high school wrestling coach whose team
was involved in a brawl that erupted during a match.132 There were two
hearings in response to the incident. 33 Both Milkovich and Scott, the
Maple Heights, Ohio, Superintendent of Schools, testified at the second
hearing, which resulted in a decision favorable to Milkovich.M The next
day, a story appeared in the defendant's local newspaper under the
headline, "Maple beat the law with the 'big lie.'"" The carry-over page
read, "Diadiun [the columnist] says Maple told a lie." 1"
The case made its way through the courts for sixteen years, raising
issues of public versus private plaintiff and fact versus opinion under
Gertz. Throughout its journey, the case was never considered by a
jury.137 Ultimately, the Ohio courts determined that Milkovich was a
private plaintiff under Gertz, 3 ' but that the defendant was protected by
128. See id. at 924-25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 925.
130. See, e.g., Franklin & Bussel, supra note 62, at 877; Gordon Shneider, A Model
for Relating Defamatory "Opinions" to First Amendment Protected "Ideas," 43 ARK. L.
REV. 57, 69 (1990); Nat Stem, State Action, Establishment Clause and Defamation:
Blueprintsfor Civil Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1175, 1224-25
n.362, 1229 (1989).
131. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
132. See id. at 2698.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Id. The column contained the following passage: "Anyone who attended the
meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his
heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath
to tell the truth." Id.
137. For a procedural history of the case, see id. at 2700-01.
138. See Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1193-96 (Ohio 1984), cert.
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9 The Ohio
the opinion defense which was supposedly created in Gertz.13"

courts adopted the Olman v. Evans""' test and found that the defendant
could be liable under the first two prongs of the test, stressing the
common meaning of the words and verifiability. 141 The courts, however,

found that under the third and fourth prongs, emphasizing context, the
case must be dismissed as a matter of law.142 Because the story appeared
in a sports column, the court reasoned that the average reader would know
it was only the author's subjective opinion and would, therefore, not
necessarily believe the accusations." Thus, if the story had appeared as

a regular news item, it would have been actionable.
In Milkovich, the Supreme Court laid out the First Amendment
protections available to defendants in defamation actions. 1 The Court
traced the public-official/public-figure/private-plaintiff distinctions from
Sullivan through

Gertz"

and the falsity and burden

of proof

requirements fashioned by Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.14

denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
139. Originally, the Ohio Supreme Court deemed the columnist's statements to be
factual assertions as a matter of law, not opinions. See Milkovich, 473 N.E.2d at 1196-97.
Subsequently, in the course of hearing Superintendent Scott's case, the Ohio court reversed
its previous decision and held that the article was "constitutionally protected opinion." Scott
v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ohio 1986). Based on Scott, the appeals court then
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the columnist. Milkovich v.
News-Herald, 545 N.E.2d 1320 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). Milkovich's appeal of that
affirmance was dismissed. See Milkovich v. News-Herald, 540 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1989),
rev'd and remanded sub nom. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
The Supreme Court's reversal is discussed infra text accompanying notes 144-54.
140. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); see also
supra notes 114-26 and accompanying text.
141. See Milkovich, 545 N.E.2d at 1324.
142. See id.
143. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2700-01. One commentator has suggested that in the
interest of creating a bright-line rule, anything appearing within the confines of an
"opinion" type column should be protected speech. See Robert N. Webneri, Note, The
Fact-OpinionDistinction in FirstAmendment Libel Law: The Needfor a Bright-Line Rule,
72 GEO. L.J. 1817, 1851 (1984).
144. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703.
145. See id. at 2704 (construing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). The importance of this part of
the opinion should not be overlooked. By restating the precedents in this area of law, many
of which were established in the 1960s under a very different Supreme Court, the Court
in 1990 effectively reaffirmed those precedents. Thus, Milkovich is often cited in support
of defamation defendants, even though the Court found in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
Don King Prods. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
146. 475 U.S. 767 (1986); See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2704 (construing Hepps, 475
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Moreover, the Court reiterated the context requirements of Bresler,
Austin, and Falwell.47 It also reaffirmed that a finding of malice is a
question of law to be examined by the Court pursuant to Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc.'" In addressing the Gertz dicta,
however, the Court determined that the Gertz Court never intended to
create a constitutional privilege for all statements characterized as
opinions."' The issue in Milkovich thus became not whether the
statements were fact or opinion, but whether they were true or false."S
This was a question for a jury to determine."' Therefore, the case was
remanded for trial. 52
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented and agreed that
the First Amendment does not require absolute protection for statements
of opinion."
Brennan and Marshall disagreed with the Court's
reasoning in this case. They claimed that, in effect, the majority
incorrectly applied the Restatement approach of examining the opinion to
see if it implied undisclosed facts.M
IIl. ARE OPINIONS Now ACTIONABLE FOR DEFAMATION?

Given that the constitutional basis for the opinion defense has been
removed, the question is whether opinions are actionable for defamation.
The discussion that follows examines whether pre-Gertz opinion-type
defenses should be exhumed, whether state courts are likely to retain the
opinion defense on the basis of freedom of expression provisions in their
own state constitutions, and whether the various factors considered by
courts in distinguishing fact from opinion are still valid.
U.S. at 767).
147. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2704-05 (construing Old Dominion Branch No. 496
v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988);
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n, v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1960)).
148. 466 U.S. 485 (1984); See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705 (construing Bose Corp.,
466 U.S. at 485).
149. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705. This was not the same Court that decided
Gertz in 1974. See id.
150. See id. at 2707.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 2708-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 2710. Brennan stated that "[t]he majority finds Diadiun's statements
actionable, however, because it concludes that these statements imply a factual assertion
that Milkovich perjured himself at the judicial proceeding.. . . Read in context, the
statements cannot reasonably be interpreted as implying such an assertion as fact." Id. at
2710-11.
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A. The Fair-CommentDoctrine
At common law, the fair-comment doctrine155 was established to
alleviate the harshness of what was, for the most part, strict liability for
defamation. 1" This doctrine developed because the burden of proof
regarding whether a statement made was true or false rested upon the
defendant. 57 If a statement could not be proven true, the plaintiff would
inevitably prevail."' Early on, it was recognized that certain classes of
statements that had public value were very difficult to prove as either true
or false."
Consequently, the common-law fair-comment privilege
developed16
The privilege was extended to statements criticizing matters of public
concern that represented the actual opinion of the critic and were based on
true or privileged statements of fact."' Generally, it was applied to
criticism of public officials in regard to their official capacities and to
people who&placed themselves before the public, such as entertainers.162
Not every state had adopted the doctrine by the time of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. ,1 but most states had accepted it to some degree."
Courts and commentators generally have presumed that the emergence of
the opinion defense after Gertz made the fair-comment doctrine
obsolete." 6 Because Milkovich eliminates the opinion defense, however,
it may make sense to resurrect the fair-comment doctrine.
155. For a thorough discussion of the common-law fair-comment doctrine and the
various problems it posed, written before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), see Herbert W. Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-A Spurious
Debate in FairComment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962).
156. See Titus, supra note 155, at 1209.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1210.
160. See Franklin & Bussel, supra note 62, at 871-75.
161. See Titus, supra note 155, at 1206-11.
162. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 cmt. e (1938) [hereinafter FIRST
RESTATEMENT].

163. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
164. See Titus, supra note 155, at 1203-04.
165. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Gertz replacement
of the fair-comment privilege in FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 162, §§ 606-10); see,
e.g., Street v. NBC, 645 F.2d 1227, 1233 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that "[t]he common law
privilege of fair comment... is now protected as opinion under the First Amendment")
(citation omitted).
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It appears, however, that the fair-comment privilege actually was
subsumed in New York limes Co. v. Sullivan16 and Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts,' 67 and consequently no longer existed at the time of Gertz.
The fair-comment doctrine was justified on the basis that "it [was]
necessary to protect the defendant's right of freedom of speech and the
public's right to find out what [was] going on in matters of 'legitimate
public interest.'"'s These were precisely the same rights that were being
protected in Sullivan and Curtis Publishing Co."s The fair-comment
doctrine relieved the defendant of the burden of proving that the
underlying facts were true, and saddled the plaintiff with the the burden
of proving that the underlying facts were false."7
The Sullivan and CurtisPublishing Co. decisions have the same effect
on public officials and public figures-the same class of plaintiffs against
whom the fair-comment privilege could be invoked. Sullivan and Curtis
Publishing Co. further require these plaintiffs to prove that the defendant
knew that the defamatory statement was false or that the defendant acted
with reckless disregard as to whether it was true or false." This is
analogous to, but broader than, the requirement under the fair-comment
doctrine that the declarant must actually hold the opinion that he states to
be true.
It does not, therefore, seem logical to revive the fair-comment
doctrine to protect defendants in the era after Milkovich.'1 Any
protection it would afford should be amply provided by the constitutional
protections that were already in place before Gertz was decided.'7 3
166. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
167. 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967).
168. Titus, supra note 155, at 1206.
169. See Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at 147; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
170. See Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at 151 n.17.
171. See id.; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
172. See, e.g., Rosner v. Field Enters., 564 N.E.2d 131, 158 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990)
(rejecting the proposition that the fair-comment doctrine should be revived in the wake of
Milkovich).
173. New Jersey has its own fair-comment privilege, which is different from the
common-law doctrine. See, e.g., Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 516 A.2d
220 (N.J. 1986). The privilege in New Jersey, which remains intact after Milkovich, is
probably broad enough to shield any defendant otherwise left unprotected by Milkovich. See
Cassidy v. Merrin, 582 A.2d 1039, 1047 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
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B. State Courts and Constitutions
Milkovich held that the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution does not require absolute protection for opinions. 74 This
holding, however, does not require state courts to find that opinions are

actionable for defamation. In interpreting the Constitution, the Supreme
Court only provides a floor of civil liberties below which a state may not
go. The states are free to provide additional protections for individual
liberties, based upon their own constitutions.1 75 Most state constitutions
have provisions analogous to the freedom of expression guarantees found
in the First Amendment. 76 These provisions could provide a basis for

keeping the
opinion defense
177

alive and unchanged,

even after

Mihkovich.
New York chose to extend this type of protection in Immuno v.
Moor-Jankowski.7 1 This action arose due to a letter published by the
defendant's medical journal, which criticized the plaintiff's plan to
establish a facility in Africa that would use chimpanzees to conduct
research on hepatitis."" The letter's thrust was that the defendant
corporation was establishing the facility in order to circumvent restrictions

on the importation of chimpanzees, an endangered species, and thus
accelerate the extinction of chimpanzees."S In reaching its decision, the
court noted that the provision in the New York Constitution corresponding
to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution was written in
174. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2702 n.5.
175. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding
that the California Supreme Court was free to interpret its own state constitution, so long
as it did not go below the floor of civil liberties established as a matter of federal
constitutional law).
176. For an exhaustive analysis of the protections provided by state constitutions and
how the various states interpret them, see Developments in the Law-Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1398-1429 (1982) [hereinafter
Developments].
177. See William J.Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protections ofIndividual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 495 (1977) (stating that "the decisions of the [Supreme]
Court are not dispositive of the questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart
provisions of state law").
178. 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2261 (1991). On the same day
the Court decided Milkovich, the Court remanded this case to the New York Court of
Appeals with instructions that the case be reconsidered in light of Milkovich. See Immuno
v. Moor-Jankowski, 110 S.Ct. 3266 (1990).
179. See id. at 1272.
180. See id.

1991]

N07E

much broader terms. The court, therefore, concluded that the provision
was intended to provide greater protection for individual rights. 8
Whether other states will choose to follow suit remains doubtful. For
various reasons, state courts are reluctant to expand individual liberties
beyond the scope provided by the United States Constitution as interpreted

by the Supreme Court." This is especially trie in defamation actions
because a plaintiff's right to recover for defamation is provided for in the

free speech clause of many state constitutions."

On the other hand,

states may reason that because the opinion defense has been accepted

precedent for sixteen years, perhaps it should be retained.
Moreover, with regard to defamation, the Supreme Court has

retreated in the area of First Amendment rights before. A plurality of the
Court held, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,'" that the Sullivan malice

standard should be applied in private plaintiff cases in matters of "public

or general interest." 1" Although this holding was later overruled by

Gertz, 1" Rosenbloom gave states the option of providing greater

protection under their own constitutions, which many states chose to
do."U It is too early to tell whether these states will take a similar
approach after Milkovich, but the potential exists.
181. See id. at 1277-78.
182. See Developments, supra note 176, at 1408-18 (describing three reasons for the
State's reluctance: (1) the United States Constitution creates a minimum acceptable level
which states may not fall below; (2) the federal and state constitutions have a maximum
acceptable level which imposes limits which states cannot exceed; and (3) states generally
have alternative means to acheive their goals without reaching the constitutional questions).
Id at 1408.
183. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; ARK. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 13; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 9; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 18; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; IND. CONST. art.
I, § 12 (1984); KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 18; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 14; LA.
CONST. art. 1, §22; ME. CONST. art. I, § 19; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XI; MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 8; MISS. CONST. art. I, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14; MONT. CONST. art. II,
§ 16; NEB. CONST. art. I, §13; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18;
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16 (1912); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6; OR.
CONST. art. I, §10; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11; R.I. CONST. art. I, §5; S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 20; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. oh. I, art. IV; W.
VA. CONST. art. III, § 17;.WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also Developments, supra note 176,
at 1400 (stating that "[w]ith a few notable exceptions, ... the states have neither generated
their own constitutional reasoning nor expanded upon the rights found under the [United
States] [C]onstitution").
184. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion).
185. Id.at 52.
186. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
187. See Developments, supra note 176, at 1405.

664.
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C. The Restatement Approach
The Restatement classifies a statement as actionable if it implies the
existence of a false statement of fact.1"' This approach still appears to
be valid because it was applied by both the majority and the dissent in
Milkovich. 1 9 But in the post-Milkovich era, this will probably work to
the advantage of plaintiffs more than it has in the past." ° At least two
commentators have criticized the Restatement approach as circumventing
the protections provided by Sullivan and Curtis Publishing Co."'l This
criticism, however, should be viewed in light of those commentators'

reliance on whether a statement is capable of being proven false 1' (i.e.,
the second prong of the Ollman test'). Thus, a defendant may be liable
for a statement he or she implied but never actually made." 9
Consequently, this approach has the potential for causing mischief and
should be used only with great care, subject to the overview of the courts,
as authorized
by Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
195

Inc.

This approach should be reserved for what the Restatement calls

"mixed" opinion and not for "pure" opinion because "pure" opinion

implies that there are no facts capable of being disproved. 19 In
determining what is "mixed" and what is "pure," however, the courts can

become involved in another murky dichotomy, such as the fact-opinion
dichotomy spawned by Gertz." 7 The terminology illustrates the problem
188. See discussion supra part II.C.
189. See supra notes 131-54 and accompanying text.
190. This is due to the anticipated increased role of the jury after Milkovich. See infra
notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
191. See Franklin & Bussel, supra note 62, at 880-85.
192. See id. at 883.
193. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
194. See id. at 882. But c. Nicole A. LaBarbera, Note, The Art of Insinuation:
Defamation by Implication, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 677 (1990) (arguing that the problems
inherent in making implication actionable for defamation can be ade4uately controlled by
the courts).
195. 466 U.S. at 514. The court held
that the clearly-erroneous standard of [FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)] does not prescribe
the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a determination of actual
malice in a case governed by New York 7imes Co. v. Sullivan. [Rather,]
[aippellate judges . . . must exercise independent judgment [to] determine
whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity.
Id. (footnote omitted).
196. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 61, § 113A.
197. C. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
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that has always occurred in distinguishing fact from opinion. "I
Language is an abstraction, and it generally is used to present other
abstractions. 1 It is therefore, by its nature, always imprecise, and any
statement can thus imply other statements.' In this light, the danger of
the Restatement approach becomes apparent. The plaintiff can always
allege that a non-verifiable statement implies other statements that are
false.
One example is an assertion by the defendant that the plaintiff is a
communist. Courts are generally reluctant to allow an action in defamation
for this type of term because they believe it does not in itself denote any
verifiable facts (i.e., the term "communist" is too vague), and it does not
imply the existence of undisclosed facts that would be actionable had they
been stated."' But this is a judgment call on the part of the court. The
statement could imply to some listeners that the plaintiff is a card-carrying
member of the communist party and is plotting with the forces of world
communism for eventual victory of the masses and world revolution.
Today, we would probably dismiss such an inference as being
thoroughly unreasonable, but thirty years ago perhaps, we would not have
done so. This illustrates the importance of context. In one context, it
seems reasonable to draw inferences from the statement; in another
context, it does not. The danger of the Restatement approach is that the
implications are always there, whether it is reasonable to draw inferences
from them or not.' 2 The courts should, therefore, exercise caution and
allow only "mixed" opinion statements that could reasonably imply the
existence of undisclosed facts to reach a jury. The question whether the
198. For an excellent analysis of the problem of determining truth through language,
see Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the FirstAmendmaent: An Essay in Memory
of Hary Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263 (1978).
199. For a fascinating account of this phenomenon, see S.I. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE
INTHOUGHT AND ACTION 155 (4th ed. 1978). Hayakawa creates an "abstraction ladder"
on which various sub-atomie particles are viewed alternatively as "Bessie," "a cow," and
"an asset." Id.
200. For example, even a verifiable statement such as "the ball is red" implies that
the speaker perceives or has knowledge of a spherical object that reflects lightwaves from

the lower end of the visible spectrum.
201. See, e.g., Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 893 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977) ("We find . . . that the use of 'fascist,' 'fellow traveller' and 'radical
right' as political labels ... cannot be regarded as having been proved to be statements of
fact, among other reasons, because of the tremendous imprecision of the meaning and usage
of these terms.

..

").

202. The danger here to free expression is genuine. As recently as 1991, the Arizona
Supreme Court ruled that if one public official calls another public official a "communist,"
action will lie for defamation, despite the fact that the words in this situation were
obviously hyperbole. See Yetman v. English, 811 P.2d 323 (Ariz. 1991).
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implication is reasonable or not should be a question of law, based on
Bresler and Austin.'
In view of this, at least one case decided since Milkovich is
particularly troubling. In Scheidler v. National Organizationfor Women,
Inc.,' while ruling on a motion made prior to Milkovich, the court
found that certain statements that "'did not imply the existence of any
undisclosed facts upon which [the defendant's] opinion was based'" and
were based only on disclosed facts that the plaintiff did not allege to be
After Milkovich, the same court
defamatory, were opinions.'
inexplicably found that the same statements were sufficiently factual to be
susceptible to being proved true or false and were thus actionable under
Milkovich. Why the court felt compelled to reach such a conclusion
after Milkovich is neither apparent nor explained.
It should be noted that the dangers of the Restatement approach
pre-date Milkovich and have not changed. Due to the various difficulties
however, it may
anticipated because of increased jury presence,'
become a larger problem.
D. The Olman Test-Verfiability and Context
The four prongs of the test developed in Oilman v. Evans
basically focus on two aspects of any piece of communication: (1)
verifiability; and (2) context.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan210 and
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts2" require plaintiffs to show that the
defendant either knowingly made false statements or made them with
203. See, e.g., Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d 711, 715-16 (11th
Cir. 1985) (holding that it is the court's duty under Bresler and Austin to examine the
context of the defamation).
204. 751 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
205. Id. at 745 (quoting Scheidler v. National Org. for Women, Inc. 739 F. Supp.
1990)).
1210, 1217 (N.D. Ill.
206. See id.
207. See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
208. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). For a useful
and detailed analysis of the Oilman opinion, see David M. Becker, Note, Structuring
Defamation Law to Eliminate the Fact-Opinion Determination: A Critique of Olman v.
Evans, 71 IOWA L. REV. 913 (1986).
209. See discussion supra part II.E. The first prong required the court to look at the
plain meaning of the words. It goes without saying that this is still required after Milkovich
because the nature of a defamation action requires the court to consider the meaning of the
words. The mere fact that the defendant spoke is irrelevant.
210. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
211. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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reckless disregard as to whether they were true or false. 212 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has held that a Sullivan malice determination is subject
to a clear and convincing standard of proof. 213 It is a question of law to
be scrutinized carefully by the court;214 this logically follows from the
Supreme Court's decision in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc.215 The Court in Bose held that an appellate court must
"'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make
sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the
field of free expression.'"216 It thus follows that a public-official or
public-figure plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a false statement
of fact.
The situation with regard to private plaintiffs, however, is not as
clear. In Gertz, the Court held that states can develop their own standard
for defamation, but that they cannot impose liability without "fault."217
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,218 the Court held that the
common-law presumption that the defamatory statement is false cannot
stand with respect to media defendants. 219 The Court also held that there
is "a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of
showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages."' ° Based
on Hepps, therefore, at least with respect to media defendants, a private
plaintiff has the burden of showing falsity. It has been argued that Gertz
requires shifting the burden of proof with respect to a non-media
defamation defendant,"' but this question has never directly been
addressed by the Supreme Court.
The traditional common-law reason for placing the burden of proof on
the defendant with respect to truth was that to do otherwise would require
the plaintiff to prove a negative.' But because this burden is now
placed on private plaintiffs in actions against media defendants, what
212. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280; Butts, 388 U.S. at 134.
'213. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
214. See, e.g., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.) (finding that
"it is important that the court make 'an independent examination of the whole record'")
(quoting Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 888 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
215. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
216. Id. at499 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284-86, and Bresler, 398 U.S. at 11).
217. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
218. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
219. See id. at 777.
220. Id. at 776.
221. See, e.g., Franklin & Bussel, supra note 62, at 857.
222. Id.
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purpose is served by not imposing the same burden on plaintiffs in actions

against non-media defendants?
The press traditionally has been given an advantage because of its role
in society-the protection it is afforded by the First Amendment and the
role it plays in furthering the "market place of ideas."' But the First
Amendment is supposed to protect freedom of speech for all Americans,
not just those who are fortunate enough to work for the media.'
Furthermore, at least three reasons exist for imposing a heavier
burden on the defendant in cases involving media defendants. First, the
harm to the plaintiff's reputation caused by a media defendant is likely to

be much greater than the harm wreaked by a private plaintiff because of
the media's wider audience. Second, the media has greater credibility than
an individual, and this is likely to cause greater harm to the plaintiff's
Finally, the media defendant is likely to have more
reputation.'
sophisticated legal advice" and can probably afford to defend a case
more readily than a private plaintiff.' This is not to recommend,
however, that the private plaintiff's burden of proof against media

defendants should be decreased. It merely suggests that it seems unfair,
in effect, to penalize non-media defendants, who arguably pose less of a
threat to a plaintiff's reputation and are less likely to have sophisticated
legal advice.
223. The "market place of ideas" concept is attributed to Justice Holmes, writing in
dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). For a good discussion of policy considerations against defamation generally,
see Rodney W. Ott, Note, Context in Defamation, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 787-91
(1990).
224. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 773
(1985) (White, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that "the First Amendment gives
no more protection to the press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their
freedom of speech").
225. See Steven H. Chaffee et al., Mass Communication and Political Socialization,
in A READER IN PUBUC OINION AND MASS COMMUNICATION 74 (Morris Janowitz & Paul
Hirsch eds., 1981). The authors state that junior and senior high-school students are
influenced more by the mass media than by their parents, friends, or teachers. See id. at
85.
226. See, e.g., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 911-12 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977). In Hotchner, Doubleday's counsel had looked at the material
before publication and had recommended deleting several passages. Id.
227. This is a generalization, of course, but media defendants are at least more likely
to have purchased libel insurance, which protects them in defamation suits. See Mare A.
Franklin, Winners and Losers and Wy: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 3 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 455, 494-96 (1980). Even the most wealthy private plaintiff is not likely
to have purchased libel insurance. Id.
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Therefore, based on Sullivan, Curtis Publishing Co., Gertz, and
Hepps, and on considerations of the rights of non-media versus media
defendants, it is logical to conclude that the First Amendment always

requires that the plaintiff prove the falsity of the statements that were
made by the defendant. Thus, the verifiability requirement of the second
prong of Ollmdn should still be intact.
The third and fourth prongs of the Ollman test require the court to
look at the context of the statement.' This is still required under the

line of cases leading from Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v.

Breslerf to Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.' The scrutiny that
the court gives to context, however, must change. In the past, courts often
examined context to determine whether the statement was opinion. Now

they must examine context to see if a statement could be believed by a
reasonable person. 1
The Supreme Court specifically agplied this aspect of the Ollman test
in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 2 The Ohio Supreme Court had

initially held that the journalist's statement describing the coach as having

lied was opinion. 3 This holding was based, in part, on the Olman test
and on a recognition that the statement appeared in a sports column, as
opposed to a pure news story.' The United States Supreme Court,
however, in remanding the case, held that this was erroneous. The
228. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1127 (1985).
229. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
230. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). In this case, Falwel, a television evangelist, brought suit
against Hustler magazine for publishing an advertisement accusing him, among other
things, of having a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. See id.
at 48. In a decision which was reasoned along the lines of Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd.,
695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983), the court held that a
reasonable person would not have believed the advertisement was supposed to be true. See
Falwel, 485 U.S. at 57; see also supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990)
(developing a three-part post-Milkovich test under which the court examines (1) whether the
defendant used figurative or hyperbolic language that would negate the impression that he
was serious; (2) whether the general context of the statement negated this impression; and
(3) whether the statement is susceptible to being proven true or false); see also Benner v.
Johnson Controls, 813 S.W.2d 16, 20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (following the holding in
Unelko); Dodson v. Dicker, 812 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Ark. 1991) (following the holding in
Unelko).
232. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
233. See Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1196-97 (Ohio 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985). For a detailed description of the procedural history of
Milkovich, see supra note 139.
234. See Milkovich, 473 N.E.2d at 1196-97.
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physical context of the wording on an opinion page, for example, should
only be used as afactorin determining whether a reasonable person would
believe that the statement was true. 5

But the weight that should be accorded to context is not clear. In
Immuno v. Moor-Jankowski,' the New York Court of Appeals split
over precisely this issue. The majority held that context had been reduced

by Milkovich to only the narrowest set of cases. 7 In a concurring
opinion, however, Judge Simons said it was not at all clear to him whether
the Supreme Court meant for context to be construed so narrowly.?8 In
a separate concurring opinion, Judge Hancock rejected the idea that the
Court had narrowed the importance of context. 9

After an analysis of these cases, it appears that the concurrences in
Immuno were correct and that the Supreme Court was not necessarily
reducing the scope of the context factor in Milkovich. Instead, the Court
was reinforcing the idea of reasonableness. The context factor often had
been applied unreasonably.' Admittedly, because the context of an
editorial will alert the reader that what he or she is reading is
"subjective," a lie printed in an editorial is not as dangerous to the victim
as a lie printed in a news story. A lie printed in an editorial, however, is
still a lie. As the Court concluded, "there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact. " " Therefore, lower courts should, as they
often have, take the physical context of the defamation into account and

235. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
236. 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1991).
237. See id. at 1274.
Mhe Court made clear that by protected type of speech it had in mind the
rhetorical hyperbole, vigorous epithets, and lusty and imaginative expression
found in HustlerMag. v. Falwell, Letter Carriersv. Austin, and Greenbelt Pub.
Ass'n v. Bresler . . .all instances where the Court had determined that the
imprecise language and unusual setting would signal the reasonable observer that
no actual facts were being conveyed about an individual.
Id. (citations omitted).
238. See id. at 1283 (Simons, J., concurring).
239. See id. at 1290 (Hancock, J., concurring). There were three concurring opinions
and no dissents in Immuno. Despite the extremely lengthy depositions and the numerous
affidavits filed, the majority and the concurrences all agreed that the plaintiff had failed to
allege any misstatements of fact. See id. at 1276, 1279 n.4 (majority); id. at 1282 (Simons,
J., concurring); id. at 1286 (Titone, J., concurring); id. at 1290 (Hancock, J., concurring).
The points of disagreement between the various opinions were whether the Supreme Court
intended to narrow the meaning of "context" significantly and whether the state court
should invoke the state constitution as alternate grounds in finding for the defendant, when
it did not have to do so. See id. at 1282-83 (Simons, J., concurring).
240. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
241. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
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give it a certain amount of weight. The mere fact that a defamation
appears as an editorial should not be a per se bar to recovery if the
editorial is explicitly premised upon false statements of fact.
The virtue of the Oilman test and the reason that it is still useful"
is that the verifiability

elements,

and contextual

under

certain

circumstances, require that the plaintiff have a chance to proceed with the
case. These circumstances occur when a court finds that the statement,
taken in context, could literally be believed as true, and the plaintiff can

offer proof that it is not true.'

Applied to the facts in Milkovich, the

question becomes not whether the columnist was expressing his opinion,

but whether he actually was accusing the coach of lying and whether the
coach actually did lie. The coach has the burden of proving that he told

the truth, and the question will be submitted to the jury.
E. The Jury Issue

Probably the greatest change to come from Milkovich will be that
more cases will go to the jury.? Most of the cases discussed in this

note have involved a court determining fact versus opinion, without the
question ever reaching a jury.'

Milkovich removed the constitutional

basis for the fact-opinion distinction.'

This changes the question,

whether the facts alleged by the statement were true, from a question of

law into a jury question. Accordingly, the role of the court will be limited
to determining whether a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.'

Based on the only statistics available, it appears that juries are much
more likely than judges to find for the plaintiff in a defamation case and
that when they do, they are likely to award more money than a judge.'
242. The third and fourth prongs, however, are scrutinized more carefully than the
first two.
243. But cf White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 522-23 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (holding that a defamatory meaning may be inferred by implication).
244. See, e.g., id. at 522.
245. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1132 (1983); Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981);
Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980); Buckley v. Littell, 539
F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
246. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
247. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (allowing appeals courts to overturn
decisions of fact only if the decision is "clearly erroneous").
248. See Franklin, supra note 227, at 473.
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Thus, Milkovich can be seen as a victory for the plaintiff's side in
defamation actions generally. But how significant is this victory?
Franklin and Bussel's study indicates that plaintiffs usually lose. 9
The defendants prevail at trial most of the time and are more than twice
as likel to have the verdict reversed or the judgment reduced on
appeal. Furthermore, the number of cases in which First Amendment
issues arise is small,"5 and many involve media defendants, who are
somewhat shielded from the effect of the jury based on New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,"

Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,'

v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.'

and Bose Corp.

Thus, although some

plaintiffs are now likely to win cases they previously would have lost, the

number of these will probably be very small.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The opinion defense has been an interesting chapter in the history of
American jurisprudence. A constitutional doctrine was created and then
flourished and evolved for sixteen years before it eventually vanished. In
hindsight, it is surprising that so many courts and commentators accepted
it at face value. Milkovich removed the constitutional basis for the opinion
defense. Although this is a slight victory for defamation plaintiffs, it is
probably a positive development for everyone. 5 The question of what
was fact and what was opinion created a spurious debate, obscuring the
real issues in many of the cases in which it was raised.' But in
249. See Franklin & Bussel, supra note 62, at 888.
250. See Franklin, supra note 227, at 468-71.
251. Id. at 491.
252. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
253. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
254. 466 U.S. 485 (1984); see supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
255. See Fran dlin & Bussel, supra note 62, at 874-80 (arguing that the opinion defense
was a stroke againstFirst Amendment protection because it shifted the emphasis away from
verifiability and the defendant's awareness that he or she was defaming).
256. See, e.g., Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1115 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979). The court held that no action lay against a newspaper whose
reporter characterized the plaintiff's activities as fraudulent and phony. The court reasoned
that the allegations were invective, not likely to be believed, and thus were protected as
"opinion." But compare Orr with Weissman v. Sri Lanka Curry House, 469 N.W.2d 471
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991), which is a good example of a defamation case coming out
differently after Milkovich. The defendant in Weissman gave a bad reference about the
plaintiff, a former employee, saying that she was dishonest. Id. at 471. The jury found that
the statement was false and made with actual malice. Id. at 472. Before Milkovich, a court
wrestling with a fact-opinion dichotomy might have been very troubled by these facts.
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analysing the opinion defense, courts have developed many useful ways
of examining the context and verifiability of allegedly defamatory
statements. Those methods will survive and should lead to more just
results in future cases.
John B. David

